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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

JAY CHARLES WADE and
WILLIAM CLIFFORD BARTLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

Case No. 880375-CA

Category 2

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404, a third degree felony, for theft of property with value
of more than $250 and less than $1,000 following a jury trial in
Seventh District Court, San Juan County, the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell, judge, presiding.

Defendant's judgment and commitment

were entered on May 10, 1988 (R. 165-166).

His notice of appeal

was filed on June 8, 1988 (R. 179).
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah
Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and S 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant Bartley and his co-defendant were

properly stopped while driving their vehicles, which led to
discovery of stolen property and their subsequent arrest.
2.

Whether the trial court properly admitted into

evidence testimony that the sheriff located a gun in Bartley's

belt at the time of his arrest and testimony that the defendant's
vehicles were taken without authorization from the impound yard
in which they were stored after their arrest*
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978:
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if
he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § "76-6-412 (1978).
Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen
property.—(1) Theft of property and services
as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable as follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i) The value of the property or
services exceeds $1,000; or
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm
or an operable motor vehicle; or
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly
weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) The property is stolen from the
person of another.
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or
services is more than $250 but
not more than $1,000; or
(ii) The actor has been twice before
convicted of theft of property or
services valued at $250 or less;
or
(iii) When the property taken is a
stallion, mare, colt, gelding,
cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull,
calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack,
jennuy, swine or poultry.
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value
of the property stolen was more than
$100 but does not exceed $250.
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value
of the property stolen was $100 or
less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a
violation of subsection (1), of section 76-6-408 may bring an action against any person
-2-

mentioned in (d) for three times the amount
of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Utah R. Evid. 103(a):
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context; or
2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is
one excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by
offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.
Utah R. Evid. 401:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
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Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a):
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect the substantial rights
of a party shall be disregarded.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information dated December 30,
1986, v/ith having committed theft of drip gas valued at more than
$250 and less than $1,000, a third degree felony, a violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 1). Arraignment was held on
December 27, 1986, and January 7, 1987 (R. 7, 13). Preliminary
hearing was held on February 25, 1987, at which time defendant
was bound over, with his co-defendant Jay Charles Wade, to stand
trial on the charges (R. 2, 22). At the arraignment in district
court, defendant entered his plea of not guilty (R. 25).
Defendant was tried by a jury on April 12 and 13, 1988,
and convicted on April 13, 1988 (R. 154-160).

Defendant was

sentenced to serve 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison and ordered
to pay restitution (R. 163, 165-166).
On May 10, 1988, defendant entered into a plea
agreement involving other charges against him (R. 167-171).

In

this agreement, defendant pled guilty to some of the regaining
charges against him, in exchange for, inter alia, the State's
recommendation that the sentences on the new convictions be
served concurrently with the sentence in the instant case (R.
170).

Defendant's notice of appeal was filed on June 8, 1988 (R.

179).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 27, 1986, Frankie Knuckles was near Bug
Point in Southern Utah, checking on various oil tanks in the
course of his employment (T. 206). At approximately 10:30 p.m.,
he saw three pickups with trailers and oil tanks driving towara
the oil fields (T. 209). At: trialf Frankie Knuckles identified
the trucks driven by defendants as two of the three trucks he saw
that night (T. 209). When the trucks passed Frankie Knuckles,
they did not bear a noticeable odor, and the tanks rattled as if
they were empty (T. 211). Frankie Knuckles called Charlie
Williams, who was employed to transport gas from the oil fields
(T. 175-176), and told him what he had seen (T. 209). Mr.
Williams then called the sheriff's office and reported the three
trucks (T. 57). He also called Robert Knuckles, an oil pumper at
the Wintershall site to inform him that he thought someone was
stealing drip gas

(T. 72, 254).

Mr. Williams explained at trial that he thought the
activities of the three trucks were suspect because he generally
knew about the legitimate gas transactions in the area.

In order

to transport gas, the trucker must present to the gas field
employees a Mrun ticket,- which these men had not.

Further he

found it concerning that the trucks were travelling so late at

Drip gas was described repeatedly at trial. It is a clear
condensed form of gas (T. 83, 104, 114), with a very noticeable
odor (T. 178-179, 257) and it is distinguishable from diesel fuel
and gasoline(T. 114, 178-179). It is produced in tanks, which
also contain some water and paraffin, which are by-products of
the condensation process (T. 181). Drip gas is used as a
cleaning agent, and some people use it in their vehicles, but it
can be very destructive to engines (T. 194, 271).
-5-

night (T. 202, 203). Theft of drip gas had occurred repeatedly
prior to the night of the instant crime (T. 202).
Soon after Mr. Williams called the sheriff's office,
San Juan County Sheriff Seth Rigby Wright received a telephone
call from a police dispatcher, informing him that Charlie
Williams had called to report three pickup trucks pulling
trailers and farm size (300-1,000 gallon) oil tanks heading
toward Bug Point (T. 56-58), where drip gas had repeatedly been
stolen (T. 177, 202). Sheriff Wright called Deputy Kirby, who
picked up the sheriff half an hour later and drove him toward Bug
Point (T. 58). On the way, the sheriff and deputy spoke with
Charles Williams and Robert Knuckles, who were parked at the
entrance area of the canyon (T. 58).
The sheriff and the deputy then drove to the point of
arrest, driving without lights to avoid detection for the last
two and a half miles prior to stopping, and parked (T. 61). They
arrived at approximately midnight, and fifteen or twenty minutes
later three sets of headlights approached from about a mile and a
half away (T. 62, 63). The sheriff left his deputy in the truck,
instructing him to turn on a red light when the defendants were
near so that they would stop (T. 63). The sheriff then walked
about fifty yards down the road to wait (T. 63). The first car
that was stopped was a pickup with a tank in the back of the
truck and was hauling a trailer with three oil tanks; the truck
was driven by co-defendant Jay Charles Wade (T. 63). The second
vehicle that stopped was a pickup hauling a trailer carrying a
large oil tank; it was driven by defendant Bartley (T. 65).

-6-

The sheriff noted that the tanks and defendants'
clothes bore a distinctive odor (T. 68, 69). From his experience
working in the oil fields, he identified the smell as drip gas
(T. 132-133).
The third set of headlight turned around prior to
reaching the location where the sheriff was waiting (T. 65).
After frisking defendants and taking a pistol from defendant
Bartley's pants (T. 80), the sheriff handcuffed the defendants,
put them in the police car, and began pursuing the third vehicle
(T. 66). The third vehicle was never located by the police, but
the tracks marking the place it turned around were located later
that morning (T. 70, 129-30).

Defendants were asked about the

third truck, but acted as if they knew nothing of it, and were
not interrogated further (T. 78).
After failed attempts to locate the third truck, the
sheriff and deputy drove back and met Charlie Williams and Robert
Knuckles, who identified the tank from which the drip gas has
been stolen that night (T. 70). The sheriff and Robert Knuckles
went to the tanks, owned by Wintershall Oil & Gas, and found one
tank which had wet ground surrounding it and paraffin (a
substance typically found in drip gas tanks) on its side and on
2
the road near it (T. 72).
A state criminologist, using an infrared
spectophotometer, compared samples of the liquid on some of
defendants' clothes with a sample of drip gas from the
2
Charles Williams explained that the area surrounding the tank
indicated that someone had drained the water and paraffin out of
the tank when they stole the drip gas (T. 181-182).
-7-

Wintershall tank, and found that the samples were comparable in
composition (T. 228-229).
There were footprints and tire tracks near the tank and
a strong odor of drip gas (T. 71-72).

The criminologist

explained that his comparison of defendants' footwear on the
night of the crime was consistent with photographs of the
footprints at the scene of the crime. (T. 225). Deputy Kirby
compared one of the tire track photographs and one of the tires
from one of the defendants' vehicles, and concluded thcit the tire
was consistent with the track (T. 244).
Robert Knuckles, who was in charge of gauging oil at
the Wintershall site, informed the sheriff that the seal on the
tank was not a company seal (T. 73).

He then checked the level

of the tank, and found that it was practically empty (T. 258).
The value of the drip gas taken was at least $929.50 (T. , 263).
No authorization was given for the draining of that tank, and it
should not have been emptied without the knowledge and signature
of Robert Knuckles or one of his employees (T. 260). He
explained at trial that this tank was the only one in the area
that they investigated in relation to this crime because it had
been stolen from recently, and because, given the time frame
between when Frankie Knuckles spotted the trucks and the time
that they arrived at the sheriff's car, that tank was probably
Testimony explained that a seal on an oil tank must be replaced
once it is opened (T. 73), that the seal legally must reflect the
person or company who last accessed the tank (T. 261), and that
the seal found at that time by Mr. Knuckles could not have been
placed there legitimately, because it was a seal from Union Oil
of California, a company with which the Wintershall site was not
transacting business at the time of the crime (T. 261),
-8-

the one that had been stolen from (T. 284). Robert Knuckles
testified that he recognized the smell of the drip gas in
defendants' tanks as the smell of the drip gas from the
Wintershall tank (T. 269).
On the morning after defendants' arrest, the sheriff
went to examine their vehicles in the impound lot (T. 83). He
noted that drip gas was leaking from one of the tanks, and found
that the 500 gallon tank on defendant Wade's truck was full,
another 500 gallon tank towed by the Wade truck was about 85%
full, and that the leaking thousand gallon tank appeared to be
4
close to full (T. 84-85).
He found in the Bartley truck a
"Union Oil of California" oil tank seal like the one placed on
the oil tank at the Wintershall site by the drip gas thieves (T.
115).
During defendants' case, Alva Rockwell, uncle to
defendant Wade, testified that his nephew made arrangements to
obtain 500 gallons of diesel fuel combined with some crude oil
from him, and that he had made a trade with defendant Bartley in
which Bartley would receive a trailer and between 1,000 and 1,500
gallons of diesel fuel from him (T. 302-308).

He testified that

the deal was made in November, and that he expected defendant
Bartley to pick up the trailer and gas then, and did not know
when defendant Bartley picked the trailer and gas up until after
defendants' arrest (T. 323). He testified that the fuel was oily
and did not have much crude in it, and was used in all kinds of
4
Prom the cross-examination at T. 86-87, it appears that the
1,000 gallon tank was towed by the truck driven by defendant
Bartley.
-9-

vehicles (T. 307, 320).
Defendant Wade testified that on the night of the
crime, he agreed to help defendant Bartley haul some oil from
Alva Rockwell's house (T. 326). He testified that he obtained
500 gallons in his own truck and that he took it home.

He then

drove to defendant Bartley's truck with some empty tanks, because
defendant Bartley could not haul the oil up the hill to Bug Point
(T. 329). He said that when they arrived at the tank that
defendant Bartley had left on the road prior to going to Wade's
for assistance, they pumped some of the fuel from the Bartley
tanks into the empty Wade tanks (T. 329). He explained that they
used a pump to distribute the fuel between the two drivers, they
began driving, and were subsequently arrested (T. 331). The
sheriff, his deputy, and the wrecker driver (who transported the
trucks to the impound yard) did not see pumps inside either truck
that night (T. 84, 169, 293).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based upon Sheriff Wright's information, he had at
least a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in

But see T. 307, where Mr. Rockwell testifies:
A well, it appeared to be diesel. It was oily
and - - but it had this crude oil smell. It didn't
look like it had much crude oil in it, but, you know,
that smell is predominant. And it - - I run [sic] as
much as I could, but I ruined my engine and - -.
(T. 307).
It should be noted that only some of the fuel supposedly
given by Mr. Rockwell to defendants came from the supply
described in the above-quoted paragraph (T. 307). Mr. Rockwell
also apparently bought, stored, and mixed a great deal of fuel
for his diesel truck (T. 314-316).
-10-

criminal activity when he and his co-defendant were stopped;
following the stop, based upon additional observations, Sheriff
Wright had probable cause to arrest defendant.
Evidence that defendant was wearing a handgun on the
night of his arrest and that the trucks he and his co-defendant
were driving were stolen from the impound yard following the
arrest was probative and not unduly prejudicial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SHERIFF HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION, BASED
ON OBJECTIVE FACTS, TO JUSTIFY AN
INVESTIGATIVE STOP.
Defendant contends that he was improperly stopped by
Sheriff Wright and that his subsequent arrest was not supported
by probable cause.
Co-defendant Jay Charles Wade, acting pro se, submitted
a motion to suppress evidence gathered as a result of defendants'
arrest on the grounds that:
Said stop was made without probable
cause and without a warrant. The stop
was not pursuant to a structured "roadblock" plan.
The stop-and-search, as conducted,
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of These United
States of America,
(R. 71-72).

A memorandum accompanying the motion explained

further defendant's view of the prosecution's acquisition of the
evidence against him (R. 73-76).
with a memorandum (R. 89-98).

The State opposed this motion

A public defender was appointed to

represent defendant Wade (R. 79), and after a hearing, the motion
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to suppress was denied (R. 99). Defendant Bartley was appointed
his present counsel on March 8, 1988 (R. 107), and then moved for
the suppression of the evidence obtained when he was arrested,
adopting the evidence and arguments previously submitted by
defendant Wade (R. 119-120).

Defense counsel addressed the

motion prior to trial, and the trial court denied it (T. 2-3).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sheriff
Wright testified that on December 27, 1986, he was called by a
dispatcher and given information that Charles Williams (T. 19)
had called in and reported that three vehicles with trailers and
tanks on them were driving toward the oil wells at between 10:30
and 11:00 p.m. (Suppression Hearing, hereinafter "S.H.", at 3).
The sheriff explained that Mr. Williams had received a call
concerning activity in the area of the oil fields, and was going
there to investigate it himself (S.H. 19). The sheriff told him
to stay out of the area, and that the sheriff would handle it
(S.H. 19)

He testified that when he and his deputy were on their

way to the oil fields, they spoke with Charles Williams, a worker
in the oil fields, and Robert Knuckles (S.H. 4).
Sheriff Wright had spoken with Mr. Williams twice
before the night of the instant crime concerning the theft of
drip gas (S.H. 18). During those previous conversations, the
sheriff instructed Mr. Williams to contact the sheriff if he got
something the police could Hput [their] teeth intoH (S.H. 18).
The sheriff and deputy drove to the Bug Point area and apparently
intended to stop every vehicle that came by that night (S.H. 910).

-12-

About fifteen minutes after the sheriff and his deputy
had parked their car, three pairs of headlights appeared on the
road about one and a half miles away (S.H. 8, 21). He testified
that when defendants pulled up, the trucks were "lugged down" and
moving slowly (S.H. 11). He noticed the smell of crude oil

on

the Wade vehicle, and then the Bartley vehicle was stopped (S.H.
11).

The Wade and Bartley vehicles matched the descriptions of

the trucks described by Charles Williams (S.H. 9, 22). The
sheriff noted that it was unusual for the pickups with trailers
and tanks to be hauling in the oil field area, because the oil
from the fields was generally hauled by small tanker trucks and
semis (S.H. 26-27).
When defendant Bartley exited the truck and was patted
down, the deputy took a pistol from the waistband of defendant's
pants (S.H. 24). Defendants were then arrested (S.H. 24).
From the time that the police car was situated and
waiting for defendants until the search for the third vehicle and
examination of the Wintershall tank were complete, Sheriff Wright
saw only one vehicle that was not involved in the investigation,
that of Lowell Rockwell, who was in the area to check his animal
traps (S.H. 20).
Defendant's argument that he was improperly stopped
while driving out of the area of the oil wells toward Bug Point
is without merit.

In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of
"Crude" is apparently a synonym for drip gas. See T. 114 (drip
gas is contrasted to refined oil); T. 304 (Alva Rockwell also
apparently refers to drip gas as "crude").
-13-

evidence uncovered as a result of a detention short of actual
arrest and allowed a frisk incident to an on-street
investigation.

The stop of defendant, and his co-defendant Wade,

was supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity and, therefore, was legitimate.
The test to be employed in determining the validity of
a stop is characterized as one of founded suspicion or reasonable
suspicion as distinct from probable cause.

Unarticulated

suspicion or hunch is not sufficient to justify a detention.
State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).

An investigative

stop if only permissible "when the officers 'have a reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual
[stopped] is involved in criminal activity.'"

l^i. at 719,

quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court again considered the
right of an officer to conduct an investigation and make a
detention and seizure based on evidence short of probable cause.
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1962), an informant who was
known to the officer advised him that a person in a nearby
vehicle had narcotics and was carrying a concealed gun in his
waistband.

The officer approached the individual in the vehicle

and requested him to open the door.

The individual did not

comply with the officer's request but rolled down the window
whereupon the officer immediately reached in through the window
and removed the weapon from the individual's waistband.

He then

arrested the person for unlawful possession of a weapon.
Subsequent to the arrest, a full search revealed the possession

•14-

of heroin and other weapons.

The Supreme Court upheld the

actions of the officer finding them permissible under the Terry
doctrine.

The Court expanded the Terry doctrine by finding that

a reasonable suspicion could be founded upon information provided
by an informant rather than information directly observed by the
officer conducting the investigation.
Citing to the Terry case, this Court in State v.
Trujiilo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987), repeated that a
"police officer, in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, may approach a person for purposes of
investigation suspected criminal behavior even through there is
not probable cause to make an arrest."

Such appropriate

circumstances have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1982), which states:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
In the present case, the police officer was able to
"point to specific, articulable facts which, together with
rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude [the suspect] had committed or was
about to commit a crime."

State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3

(Utah App. 1988), quoting, Trujiilo, 739 P.2d at 88.
First, as detailed above, he had information from a
known, reliable informant that three vehicles equipped with farmsize tanks were driving into the Bug Point area late at night.
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He had previously received information that repeated thefts of
drip gas had occurred in that specific area.

The lateness of the

hour was alarming in that it was not during normal business hours
for oil transactions.

Sheriff Wright had been given a

description of the trucks; the nature of the vehicles was unusual
in that tankers or semi trucks are normally used to transport oil
from the wells.

The area is remote and not frequently used at

that hour of the night; in fact, only one other vehicle was
present in the area that night.
Once the vehicles came into sight, Sheriff Wright
observed that they were heavily laden, lugged down, and slow.

As

soon as the vehicles reached the location of the sheriff, he
observed the noticeable, obnoxious odor of drip gas.

He could

also smell the oil product on the defendants themselves.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Sheriff Wright
had at least a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had
occurred.

Consequently, he was justified in making the stop of

the vehicles.

Once the stop had occurred and he determined that

the defendant's tanks did in fact contain drip gas, he has
probable cause to make the arrest.

Because the stop was

justified based upon Terry reasonable suspicion standards, it is
unnecessary to consider whether a "roadblock" was used.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
WERE CORRECT, AND IF ERROR, HARMLESS.
During the trial, evidence was introduced indicating
that a pistol was taken from defendant Bartley, who had tucked it
into his pants prior to approaching the deputy's car (T. 67).
-16-

Evidence was also introduced that defendants' trucks, trailers,
and tanks were stolen from the impound yard after the defendants
were arrested (T. 116-120).

The court allowed the testimony into

evidence over objection (T. 81, 89, 120-122).

No cautionary

instructions were requested or given.
On appeal, defendants cite Utah Rules of Evidence 402
and 403, arguing that the trial court should have excluded the
evidence because it was irrelevant and prejudicial (App.Br. 1922).
The confiscation of defendant's gun was relevant to
explain the circumstances of defendant's crime and arrest.

See

State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977) (defendant,
charged with murder, could not complain that evidence of a rape
occurring immediately after the murder was unduly prejudicial,
because "the evidence concerning the rape . . . was so closely
involved in the total picture of the crime, and defendant's
possible motive for the killing, that it is difficult to see how
it properly could have been excluded"); State v. Daniels, 584
P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978) ("[E]vidence of other crimes allegedly
committed by the defendant is not admissible if the purpose is to
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a
propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed the
crime charged.

However, if the evidence has relevancy to explain

the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible
for that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the
defendant with another crime will not render it incompetent.")
(Footnote omitted.)
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After defendant Bartley was stopped, Sheriff Wright
found a handgun tucked inside his belt.

This evidence was

admitted at trial over objection (T. 80-81).

Additional evidence

was admitted at trial, without objection, that Sheriff Wright
located in Bartley's vehicle a 308 rifle and a pistol scabbard
and belt (T. 76). Evidence of the pistol in Bartley's belt was
not unduly prejudicial.

First, evidence of another weapon and

scabbard was admitted, which minimized the effect of the
possession of the pistol.

Second, simple possession of a weapon

does not portray defendant as a "lawless, gunslinger" (App. Br.
at 20), particularly when viewed in the context of the remote
Southern Utah area and the lateness of the hour.
The theft of the trucks and trailers subsequent to
defendants' arrest was relevant to explain the absence of
physical evidence at trial.

As the result of the theft, the

State was unable to determine the precise amount of drip gas or
precise chemical content of the tanks.

Other evidence was sent

to the Utah State Crime Lab for analysis, including defendants'
clothes and samples of drip gas from the site of the theft.

As

the trial court properly found, the jury was entitled to know why
the State did not have the additional evidence (T. 120-21).
Further, inasmuch as there was absolutely no evidence
or implication that defendants arranged for or were involved in
the theft of the trucks and trailers, the admission of this
evidence was not prejudicial to them at all.
Assuming for purposes of argument that the admission of
the evidence of defendant's gun and the theft of the trucks and

-18-

trailers was error, because there was ample evidence of
7
defendants' guilt, it was harmless error.
Defendants' trucks and apparently empty tanks were seen
near the scene of numerous thefts of drip gas at around 10:30
p.m. (T. 202, 206-211).

One of the drip gas tanks in the oil

field was drained by thieves that night (T. 258), and the value
of the drip gas taken was at least $929.50 (T. 263). Defendants
were arrested, and their tanks and clothes had the unique smell
of drip gas (T. 68, 69, 132-133).

Samples of the liquids on

defendants' clothes matched the liquid in the tank that was
drained by the thieves (T. 228-229).

A tank seal was found in

defendant Bartley's truck that was identical to a seal placed by
the thieves on the tank that was illegally drained (T. 261, 115).
Footprints and tire tracks at the scene were consistent with the
footwear and tires of defendants (T. 71-72, 225, 244).
Defendants were not authorized to take the gas (T. 202-203).
Because the evidence of the defendants' guilt was very
substantial, the impact of the contested evidence would have
been, at most, minimal.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, William Clifford Bartley, was properly
convicted of theft.

For the foregoing reasons, and any

Utah Rule of Evidence 103 provides, in part, "Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of the party is affected . . . ."
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additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of Utah
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
DATED this v £ /

day of May, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

-A.
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A^s^istant Att<5rney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Lyle R. Anderson, attorney for defendant, P.O. Box 75,
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June 1, 1989

Mary Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
RE:

State v. Bartley, Case No. 880375-CA
Supplemental Authorities

Dear Ms. Noonan:
I filed the State's response brief on May 30, 1989 in
the above-entitled case, but upon further reflection and
consideration, I feel compelled to bring to the attention of this
Court an additional issue. The issue was not raised by the
appellant, but in candor with this Court, the issue should be
considered and disposed of by this Court. First, the issue is of
a constitutional dimension and should be decided as a matter of
fairness and justice to the defendant. Second, as a practical
matter, the issue could be the subject of a proceeding for postconviction relief and it would expedite the finality of this
conviction to have the issue determined. Therefore, pursuant to
R. Utah Ct. App. 24(j), I am filing the following supplemental
authorities. I will advance argument during oral argument;
alternatively, this Court may wish to request briefing on this
issue.
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Relevant parts of the record:
Transcript at 77-78:
Q [Prosecutor during direct examination
of Sheriff Wright] You placed the
individuals under arrest?
A [Sheriff Wright] Yes, they were, you
know. That was done immediately. Then we
stopped while we were kind of waiting for
Millet [UHP] to come up in his vehicle. We
advised them of their Miranda rights.
Q And at that time they were located in
your patrol car?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did they make any statement to you?
A No, sir.
Q No statement at all?
A Kirby asked if they knew who was in
the other pickup, and they acted like they
didn't have any knowledge of that. And so we
didn't interrogate them.
Transcript at 349-53:
Q [Prosecutor during cross-examination
of co-defendant Wade (Bartley did not
testify)] With regard to any conversations
you may have had there as you were picked up
by Sheriff Wright and Officer Kirby, did you
ever offer any explanation of your
whereabouts that evening?
MR. CHIARA: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Objection overruled. Did you
ever offer any information as to your
whereabouts that evening and why you were
there?
THE WITNESS: [Wade] No.
Q (By Mr. Halls) Didn't you think that
it was important to tell them that you had
just gone to pick up another tank? That may
have cleared this whole thing up?
MR. ANDERSON: Objection, Your Honor.
The prosecution is asking him to explain why
he didn't volunteer some information to the
police. He has no obligation to do that, and
he's suggesting that the jury should draw a
conclusion from that.
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THE COURT: There's nothing wrong with
that, Mr. Anderson. He's testified, and now
he's subject to cross examination to give all
of his explanations to this matter. So, the
objection is overruled. He will be allowed
to go into that, if you'd care to, Mr. Halls.
Q (By Mr. Halls) Did you ever, at the
jail or at any other time, offer any
explanation to any authorities about your
activities that night?
A No. I thought it best to keep quiet.
What they basically asked me was who was the
third vehicle. There was no third vehicle.
Q Okay. But did it ever come to your
mind that if you were to offer some
explanation to show them where you turned
around in the road; to show them where you
had pumped the fuel into your tank, that it
may have cleared up some of the problems?
MR. ANDERSON: I object on the grounds
this isn't part of the cross examination. We
never said anything about it.
THE COURT: Objection overruled. You
can't have it both ways, you know. It's
subject to cross examination; all the
incidents that have any materiality to this
thing whatsoever.
MR. HALLS: Well, Mr. Anderson got into
conversations about —
THE COURT: It doesn't matter, Mr. Halls.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: What was the question?
Q (By Mr. Halls) Did it ever occur to
you that by explaining, showing the officers
where you turned around, where you
transferred the fuel, those kinds of things,
where your tire tracks were, that that may
have cleared up some of your problems?
A Well, once I was arrested — When you
are pulled up in the middle of the night and
there's no lights on the car and the red
light comes on, you get a little concerned.
And you get even more concerned when a
shotgun is pointed on you. I didn't know
what I had done.
Q But your answer to the last question,
then, is, I take it: no, it never occurred
to you to explain that to the officer?
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A Well, really, I was afraid to say
anything.
Q Okay. When you were arrested, did the
officer tell you why you were arrested? Did
he tell you you were being placed under
arrest for theft of drip gas?
A No. I didn't know any kind of crime
had been committed. He just put me in the
car.
Q Then you went and looked at the scene
and —
A Yes. I was read my rights, and an
hour later we road [sic] around in the car.
Q Then you knew why you were being
arrested?
A. Yes.
Q You knew you were being arrested for
theft of drip gas?
A Yes.
Q And it still didn't occur to you to
explain to the officer what you were doing
there?
A All they wanted to know —
Q Did it or did it not occur to you to
explain to the officer why you were there?
A No.
Relevant authorities:
U.S. Const, amend. V (in relevant part):
"No person shall be held to answer . . . nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."
Utah Const, art I, § 12 (in relevant part):
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . . An accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself . . . ."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (defendant must be
advised of privilege against self incrimination prior to
custodial interrogation to allow introduction of evidence at
trial).
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutor's comment
on defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent and
failure to testify is constitutionally impermissible).
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Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prosecutor may not cross
examine defendant regarding postarrest silence).
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984) (eliciting evidence of
a defendant's postarrest silence may violate the privilege
against self-incrimination, but need not be prejudicial error).
State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373 (Utah 1982) (comment on postarrest
silence not error where necessary to clarify discrepancies
regarding defendant's opportunity to provide information to
authorities). See also State v. Singleton, 693 P.2d 68 (Utah
1984); State v. Holes, 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982); State v. Urias,
609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980).
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (if comments violate
privilege against self-incrimination, standard of review for
error of a constitutional dimension is whether it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
If you have questions or desire additional information,
please contact me. Thank you.
Sincerely,

tit Y$n~ />$/jv?fL—
IBARA BEARNSON
Assistant Attorney General
BB:bks
cc:

Craig Halls
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing letter of supplemental authorities was mailed, postage
prepaid to Lyle R. Anderson, attorney for William Clifford
Bartley, P. 0. Box 275, Monticello, UtafT)84535, on this 1st day
of June, 1989.
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